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Abstract 
 
A method to detect Trojan horses in messaging and Bluetooth in mobile phones by means of 
monitoring the events produced by the infections is presented in this paper. The structure of 
the detection approach is split into two modules:  the first is the Monitoring module which 
controls connection requests and sent/received files, and the second is the Graphical User 
module which shows messages and, under suspicious situations, reports the user about a 
possible malware. Prototypes have been implemented on different mobile operating systems 
to test its feasibility on real cellphone malware. Experimental results are shown to be 
promising since this approach effectively detects various known malware. 
 
 
Keywords: Security, mobile devices, mobile malware, spyware 
1458                 Ortega et al.: A Novel Approach to Trojan Horse Detection in Mobile Phones Messaging and Bluetooth Services 
1. Introduction 
Mobile devices currently represent the most wide-ranging and fastest technology. Even 
personal computers are not advancing, or improving as quickly as this growing technology. 
According to the International Telecommunication Union, even during a global crisis period, 
the number of mobile broadband subscriptions will exceed one billion in 2010 after reaching 
600 million in 2009. This organization added that the ranks of cell phone subscribers will grow 
to five billion people in 2010 [1]. Today's smartphones have the same processing power and 
characteristics as a traditional PC. They do not only provide basic services, e.g. voice 
communication and text messaging, but also offer other data services such as GPS connection, 
emailing and web surfing. In addition to personal information in the form of contacts and 
emails, users can save large documents, high-quality videos and images, complex games and 
music albums. Nevertheless, security experts have found a growing number of infections that 
target cellular phones.  
Currently most mobile users feel no need to install an antivirus program or other software on 
their terminals to protect their phones from potential infections. However, due to the 
exponential growth of services and capabilities of these devices and the vast amount of 
information they contain, it is essential to take measures against a possible attack.  It is worth 
noting that the potential effects of virulent malware infections on consumers and phone 
providers are severe, including identity and information theft, permanent disablement of 
mobile devices, excessive fees to customers, and loss of revenue for mobile phone providers. 
In fact, when a user buys a mobile phone, none of the pre-installed applications is antivirus 
software. The most common procedure is that, if a mobile device becomes infected, the user 
downloads the corresponding patch to delete the malware, nevertheless the device stays 
unprotected. 
Let us consider a cellphone malware as malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities in 
cellphone software and propagates in networks through popular services such as Bluetooth 
and messaging (SMS/MMS) services. There is also an overlap in how malware is termed, thus 
it could be called a trojan, backdoor, worm, or virus. It is rare that the predominant antivirus 
vendors will agree on the general category (much less the name) of a virus. The breakdown of 
malware is summarized in Table 1 which shows the percentage of malware in 2009 that was 
labelled with a generic category by at least one vendor [2]. The values add up to much more 
than 100 percent, meaning many viruses are not only labelled as something generic, but also 
labelled with multiple generic names. It can be seen that trojans comprised the most common 
class of malware in 2009. Hence, the behaviour of the Trojan horses which use messaging and 
Bluetooth services in mobile phones is studied in this paper. Furthermore, it is indicative of the 
attacker’s preference to infect machines so that a host of malicious activities (advantageous to 
the attacker) can be launched from these devices. These malicious activities usually imply 
high or low-level events in the user's attacked phone such as an email reception or a Bluetooth 
connection request. These events are produced in the system since a connection to the attacked 
device and transmission of exchange information is necessary. During their execution, 
infections such as trojans wait for orders from an external malicious user who tries to send 
information to the infected phone by different means of communication, such as SMS [3]. 
Furthermore, malware can use the mobile phone network to propagate as on the Internet. 
Mobile phone networks can quickly detect malware and employ defences to contain it 
before it infects much of the susceptible device population [4]. Nevertheless, mobile malware 
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has another opportunity for propagation since it can propagate through direct pair-wise 
communication mechanisms, such as Bluetooth and SMS, between mobile devices in 
geographic proximity [5,6]. Although slower than propagating over the network, proximity 
malware has the compelling advantage of being unobserved by the provider network making 
detecting proximity malware substantially more challenging. However, these connections 
produce events in both devices while the connection is established or files are sent. Hence, 
situations like the arrival of a new MMS message or the sending of a file through Bluetooth 
cause events at high (i.e. SMS received) or low (i.e. socket connection) level in an infected cell 
phone.  
 
Table 1. 2009 Malware Trends. Many viruses can be labelled with multiple generic names. 
Malware Class Percentage of total malware 
Trojan Horse 87 
Virus 47 
PUP 42 
Worm 21 
Backdoor 20 
 
By using mobile events and taking advantage of high processing capabilities of modern cell 
phones, a new method is proposed that can be executed in background and real time, which 
monitors and analyzes suspected events to detect Trojan horses when they need to use 
messaging or Bluetooth services. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related work 
on trojans and other malware is shown in Section 2. In Section 3 the general structure of the 
proposed approach to detect Trojan horses is described. In order to test the implementations, 
real cases have been applied in different scenarios and the corresponding monitoring results 
are given in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
2. Related Work 
In recent years, SMS has become a lucrative playground for attacks and frauds such as 
spamming, phishing and spoofing. The small size of anSMS (it has 160 characters) is the main 
reason why there has not been a large-scale infection yet. Nevertheless, the size of the MMS is 
imposed by the service provider: it usually exceeds 300KB, which seems an appropriate size 
to accommodate a malware. Although Bluetooth technology provides levels of security based 
on the identification of the devices involved, the number of vulnerabilities via Bluetooth has 
increased considerably. The dynamics of mobile phone malware that propagates by proximity 
contact is considered in [7][8] where strategies for detecting and mitigating proximity 
malware from a simple local detection to a globally coordinated defence are studied. In [9], 
combination of four detection schemes is proposed, called SMS-Watchdog, which builds 
normal social behaviour profiles for each SMS user and then uses them to detect SMS 
anomalies in an online and streaming fashion. For instance, features such as SMS sent count, 
RAM-free space and CPU usage, are sent to a remote server for SMS intrusion detection [10]. 
Other studies focus on malware and user behaviours. An agent-based malware modeling 
(AMM) framework is given in [11] where a representation of malware behaviours is based on 
the key observation that the logical ordering of an application’s actions. This approach 
discriminates between the malicious behaviour of malware from the normal behaviour of 
applications by training a classifier based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [12]. A 
method is presented in [13] which observes unique behaviours of the mobile phone 
applications and the operating users on input and output constrained devices. Since smart 
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phones are used to store users’ identities and sensitive information/data, it is necessary to 
authenticate legitimate users and to block imposters. Based on the analysis of keystroke data 
of diverse smart phone users, a keystroke dynamics-based PIN-verification mode is developed 
in [14], which ensures information security on smart phones.   
Some works propose the study of other mobile features. For instance, a power-aware 
malware-detection framework that monitors, detects, and examines previously unknown 
energy-depletion threats is proposed in [15], and a malware detection method that uses power 
consumption to detect anomalous behaviours on cellphones, called VirusMeter, which is 
designed in [16]. VirusMeter applies machine learning techniques to further improve the 
detection accuracy of real malware, including FlexiSPY and Cabir. Another alternative is 
proposed in [10] where a power-aware malware-detection framework that monitors and 
analyzes unknown energy depletion threats is given. Nevertheless, these battery and 
current-based approaches depend on the quality and age of the battery since the internal 
resistances of these, influence the results.  
The presented approach in this paper is based on analyzing system-specific events 
produced by Trojan horses which use message or Bluetooth services in their infection process.  
Today, these two infection vectors are not only the most popular ones among existing 
smartphone viruses, but also the most dangerous ones, because they are unique to 
smart-phones and have strong spreading capability. Thus, it is critical to have a security 
solution that can effectively combat these viruses. 
3. Trojan Horse Detection through Events Monitoring 
If a user sends an email or an SMS to another user then an event which announces this arrival 
is produced. Some similar situations happen if a user tries to establish a Bluetooth connection 
or send a file. In all cases, the user is informed through an alert (sometimes with sound) in the 
graphical interface of the phone. Obviously, one goal of malware, especially in Trojan horses, 
is to leave no trace, and hence, this software tries to avoid all types of alerts or other ways 
which can help users to detect the infection. For example, in Neo-Call spyware [3], a malicious 
user communicates with an infected phone through SMS messages. The user is not informed 
of these sent and received SMS. Furthermore, none of these messages are saved into the SMS 
inbox or outbox of the attacked user’s phone. However, low-level events are produced and, 
using these events and appropriate monitoring, suspicious behaviours like this can be detected. 
Taking advantage of this fact, an events-based technique to detect both known and unknown 
Trojan horses is presented to the following. 
3.1 Generic Client Design 
The generic structure of the method includes two main components for the events monitoring: 
the User Interface and Monitoring modules (see Fig. 1): 
The User Interface enables clients to observe monitoring state. It can be used to visualize 
established connections (used ports and protocols) and the latest sent and received SMS, MMS 
and files through Bluetooth.  Using this interface, if the Monitoring Module detects an 
anomaly in the data sent/received or in a connection request, then a user can accept or decline 
the request. If the user accepts, then the Monitoring Module will transfer the control to the 
operating system to establish the connection or send the message to a specific folder. 
    The Monitoring Module is the most important since its main task is the management of 
connections and sent and received data using events. It is made up of small modules that 
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manage Bluetooth, SMS and MMS communication mechanisms. Suspicious events such as 
the arrival or sending of an SMS or a multimedia file through Bluetooth are studied by the 
Monitoring Module. This module is composed of the Connection and File submodules: the 
Connection Submodule controls protocols where a previous connection is necessary before 
sending or receiving a file or a message. Each connection is defined by a protocol and a 
specific port. Usually, malicious applications send attached infections through instant 
messaging or Bluetooth changing the default protocol and port to avoid notifications. In this 
submodule there is a configuration file that stores the default Bluetooth and messaging 
protocols and  ports as well as the protocol and port detail of each accepted connection. When 
an external user tries to connect in a suspicious way, an event is produced and the Connection 
Submodule (through the User Interface) will show the details about the connection through a 
message. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Monitoring client structure. 
 
On the other hand, the File Submodule controls messages and files which can be sent or 
received. This submodule analyzes the frequency of received files or messages and the origin 
(path) of the programs which send the suspicious files. The first feature can be configurable to 
detect the propagation of a Trojan horse which tries to spread to other devices analyzing the 
time between two similar events. For instance, it is not usual that a user sends a large amount 
of SMS in a short time because it needs a time to write the message and search the contacts 
before sending it. The second feature examines the installation path of an application because 
some malicious applications do not use the default folders to avoid being recognized. In the 
File Submodule there is another configuration to store the minimum time between two events, 
the installation path by default and the names and their folder of accepted Bluetooth and 
messaging applications.  
Using these submodules, the Monitoring Module can detect files within which a Trojan 
horse infection can be packed. Hence, if a file is sent or received then an event is produced and 
the File Submodule will determine whether it is an infection. 
    A flowchart of the behaviour when a user tries to establish a connection or send a file is 
depicted in Fig. 2. Let's consider an application which implements our method is running in 
the background. When the message sent or the connection request arrives to the phone, an 
event is produced and the application starts to analyze it. Using the Monitoring Module, a 
connection request or a file is analyzed by the Connection Submodule or File Submodule 
respectively. If the Monitoring Module detects a possible infection, then a message is in 
real-time mode sent to the user via the User Interface module. In this message, the connection 
or file details (sender number, port and the path of the program) are shown. If a connection 
request is finally rejected, then it will not be established. If a file such as SMS or MMS is 
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rejected, then the message will not be sent to the inbox or outbox. And if finally a connection 
or a file is accepted, the Monitoring Module will hand the control over to the operating system 
to establish the connection or place the file in the correct folder. The decision and the details 
about the message or the file are saved in a text file for future messages/connections requests 
with the same details. Furthermore, this file can be edited and modified by the user. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Monitoring client behaviour when an external user tries to establish a connection or send a 
message. 
3.2 The Symbian Client  
The monitoring client was developed in Symbian C++ version S60 3rd with Nokia Carbide 
IDE. The User Interface module shows the active connections and the last 10 sent/received 
messages. This module admits or rejects the archives or connection requests. For reasons of 
program stability and to prevent interferences, the GUI runs in a thread separate from the other 
components. In the Symbian Monitoring Module, the Connection Submodule analyzes the 
port and protocol for each connection. 
    The main reason is that, by using sockets, hackers can transfer data to a phone while no 
message appears on the user screen to warn against the attack. In Symbian C++, a socket is 
defined by a port and a protocol. Hence, when an unusual port is used, the Monitoring Module 
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sends a notification to the user through the user interface. The File Submodule controls the 
number of messages and times them. Furthermore, it analyzes the path of the programs that 
send/receive messages or connection requests. For example, a massive sending of SMS could 
be an infection in its propagation process. Using the User Interface module, the user can 
configure the interval time and message limit parameters. 
3.3 The Windows Mobile Client  
For Windows Mobile operating system, the Monitoring client structure has been implemented 
using the Windows Mobile 6 Professional Software Development Kit and the Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2008 programming environme 
    The main difference in the implementation between Windows Mobile and Symbian SO is 
the events capture. Windows Mobile APIs provide some classes and functions to indicate 
when a message is sent, received or a connection is established. For example, the 
MessageInterceptor class has the MessageReceived() event-handling function to show when 
an SMS has been received. Hence, these classes are used to capture the events and implement 
the Connection and File Submodules. In Symbian operating system however, sockets are 
necessary to capture the same events. 
3.4 Android Architecture Draft  
The Open Handset Alliance Project Android [17] aims to develop the first complete, free, and 
open mobile platform. Open means that all sources have been published with the release of the 
first Android handset in the second half of 2008. Android is based on Linux kernel 2.6 and 
provides tools and APIs necessary to develop 3rd-party applications using Java. Android 
applications can be compiled to be executed in a virtual machine called Dalvik virtual 
machine, which is not compatible with Java SE or ME. The monitored feature set of android 
devices is slightly different from that of Symbian OS and Windows Mobile. Since the 
openness of Android allows modification of almost every software component and Linux was 
used as the core OS, this platform provides a good foundation for building a monitoring agent 
which benefits from several years of Linux security research. A simple architecture is 
proposed in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Correspondence between Android OS layers and our approach. 
 
    The Monitoring Module is split and the User Interface module and the Connection 
Submodule are included in the Java layer because the Android Java environment provides 
several libraries for their implementation. Since accessing security relevant system 
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characteristics might be problematic using native calls from Java applications (JNI), the File 
Submodule is placed in the Linux OS layer. 
3.5 iPhone Architecture Draft  
The iPhone handheld [18] designed by Apple Inc. is based on the iPhone OS mobile operating 
system. The iPhone OS consists of a number of different software layers, each of which 
provides programming frameworks for the development of applications that run on top of the 
operating system: 
 The iPhone OS Cocoa Touch Layer contains the most commonly used frameworks 
for iPhone application development.  
 The iPhone OS Media Layer provides the iPhone OS with audio, video, animation 
and graphics capabilities. 
 The iPhone OS Core Services Layer provides much of the foundation on which the 
above layers are built. It includes services such as database connection and 
geographical location data. 
 The iPhone OS Core OS Layer is the closest layer to the hardware. It provides 
services including low-level networking, memory management, file system handling 
and threads. 
A simple correspondence scheme between the iPhone architecture and the proposed approach 
is shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Correspondence between iPhone OS and our approach 
 
    The Monitoring Module is divided into two parts. The User Interface module and the File 
Submodule correspond to the Cocoa Touch Layer. This layer contains the necessary 
frameworks to implement the events, messages and data handling and user interface creation 
and management. However, the Connection Submodule corresponds to the Core OS Layer 
because it contains the network framework to control the established connections. Specifically, 
the iPhone OS Security framework provides all the security interfaces for connection with 
external networks including certificates, public and private keys, trust policies, keychains, 
encryption, etc. 
4. Experimentation 
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In this section, several examples of real mobile malware are used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the detection method. First, we conduct individual test through different real malware and 
after it we tested it in a group of different users. 
4.1 Experiment on the Detection of the Trojan-SMS.Win-CE.Sejweek Trojan 
The behaviour of the “Trojan-SMS.WinCE.Sejweek” trojan for Windows Mobile has been 
simulated in a HTC 3300 PDA. This infection is commonly found associated with pirated 
software because it downloads an XML file from a website which contains the numbers of 
premium rate SMS numbers and the frequency at which the expensive ($1 per message) SMS 
messages are sent. This trojan uses the XML labels to interpret the information and send the 
SMS. 
4.1.1 Simulation 
For the experiment, an attacked user receives a MMS with a picture, which includes the 
infection. In this experiment, a XML file has not been used but instead the phone numbers are 
sent by SMS from a malicious user phone. It is thought that the trojan is installed and it can 
send contact information to these phone numbers through SMS messages. Furthermore, the 
propagation action in the infection program has been implemented. When the trojan finishes 
sending all the SMS messages, the picture file (with the trojan) is sent to all contacts. The 
attacked user has been simulated by the Visual Studio Simulator tool included in Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2008. When the simulation begins, the Trojan horse starts to run in the 
background while the user only sees the picture in his PDA. The Microsoft Tool Cellular 
Emulator v1.43 was also used to enable the malicious user to send and receive MMS and SMS 
messages and make calls (including other services) to the Visual Studio’s emulator. Thus, the 
simulation of information exchange through MMS or SMS between mobile devices has been 
carried out in an efficient way without using the services of any company. The main objective 
of this infection is to obtain private data from the attacked phone. In this application that 
information will consist of the contact names and telephone numbers. 
    The main Windows Mobile 6 SDK classes used for the demonstration were: 
- OutlookSession: This allows, among other functions, the access and modification of 
data in the Contacts. In this case, the nickname and the phone number are used. 
- MessageInterceptor: This personalized message receiver implements the channel that 
allows the infection to remain pending for an incoming SMS. The purpose of the 
MessageInterceptor class will be a key factor in the implementation of the Trojan horse 
and the proposed solution, because it contains the event which receives SMS messages 
(MessageReceived()). 
- SmsMessage: Implements the creation and sending of SMS. 
- MmsMessage: Implements the creation and sending of MMS. 
    The behaviour on the user’s attacked device is (see Fig. 5): 
1. The attacked user receives the picture where the Trojan horse infection is packed. The 
file can be transferred from the Internet through MMS or via Bluetooth to the terminal. 
2. Once the virus reaches the mobile phone, it automatically installs itself.  
3. The malicious program awaits orders. The attacker’s instructions are introduced by 
means of an SMS with a default structure. 
4. If the received SMS is in the correct format, in this case with the heading @spy@, the 
content processing begins. Otherwise, the message goes to the users inbox. 
5. The Trojan horse then checks the label-value pairs. The parser recognizes the pairs 
<sms>telephone_number. 
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6. The program automatically sends the Contact data in the Phonebook to each phone 
<sms>telephone_number pair which appears in the SMS received. In the demo, it was 
sent via SMS to each contact name and phone number with the format 
contact_name:telephone_number although other data could also be sent.  
7. The Trojan program is sent by MMS to all contacts for the propagation of this malicious 
software. An MMS for each contact telephone number is necessary because the size of 
the installer is 52KB. 
8. Once every SMS and MMS has been sent, the Trojan horse infection awaits for new 
orders. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Trojan-SMS.WinCE.Sejweek trojan behaviour. 
 
    The Trojan horse has been installed in the victim’s mobile phone. Now, the hacker will carry 
out the following steps: 
1. The malicious user sends an order to the Trojan horse via on SMS to the user under 
attack in an appropriate format, which in the test application is 
@spy@<sms>telephone_number<sms>telephone_number<sms>… 
2. The attacker awaits the response of the Trojan horse.  
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3. The attacker begins to receive SMS messages with the structure  
contact_name:telephone_number-                                                 
contact_name:telephone_number-…  
    The messages are processed through a second parser through which the malicious user 
decides how to process the information. This process can be repeated if the attacked user 
remains aware of the infection. 
4.1.2 Detection and Results  
The MessageReceived() event provided by Windows Mobile SDK is implemented by the 
MessageInterceptor() method to detect any access via SMS or MMS that occurs in the system. 
Furthermore, the OnClick() event helps us to identify the user interaction with the device.  The 
analyzing procedure starts when the program sends various messages without previous click 
events and the difference between two sent messages is less than 3 seconds, whereby the 
Monitoring Module accesses the process manager to scan the path of all the processes (the 
number of processes running is limited to 32). Previously, a text file is saved with the 
information data of authorized programs to check whether the program file is a possible Trojan 
horse. So, if a program fails to appear in the known-programs list, then a message is displayed 
using the User Interface module. Obviously, the whole process takes place without the user 
being aware of the attack because the Trojan horse remains running in the background. In 
addition, no messages sent from the device to the attacked phone enter the mailboxes and 
hence no suspicion is detected.  
    Sending SMS and MMS messages entails an economic cost and, for a possible estimation, it 
is assumed that the average length of the contact name or nickname is 10 characters. Usually, 
mobile phone numbers have nine characters and, if a space is added, then this information 
consumes twelve characters. Let us suppose that an average user has 100 contacts stored in his 
phone book, and that, in Spain, an SMS costs 0.20€ on average. Thus, adding two separating 
characters per contact, 2.62€ will be the cost in SMS if a malicious user requests data from the 
contacts in the agenda of the attacked device. Finally, if the cost of one MMS (1€ 
approximately in Spain) is taken into account, then the trojan propagation (the infection) 
consequences could cost about 102,62€. It is important to note that the malicious user can 
begin this process at any time. Finally, for the detection process, it is used several antivirus 
mobile programs such as AirScanner 3.0 [19] and BullGuard 2.0 [20]. These experiments 
show that none of these solutions are capable of detection the Trojan horse implementation. 
However, the proposed solution detected the Trojan horse in every single test. With regard to 
time cost, due to the detection method is based on event detection, the total spent time until the 
infection is detected, is related to the frequency of events generated by the Trojan horse, the 
used protocols and the attacked operating system. If a Trojan horse generates a small number 
of events or it generates like a human through typical events interaction (for example, 
onClick() before MessageSent() in case of a SMS in Windows Mobile) and using defaults 
ports and protocols our tool could not detect it (but notifications will be visible for the user). 
4.1.3 Symbian Variant  
The Trojan-SMS.WinCE.Sejweek trojan has been successfully implemented for Symbian SO 
using a Nokia 6120 Classic and Net60 library [21]. This library enables the adaptation of our 
Windows Mobile code from C# to C++. Therefore, the code of the first experiment has been 
reused. However, Symbian SO fails to contain any event listener for SMS or MMS. For this 
reason, event handling functions have been simulated using sockets, SMS and MMS protocols 
and default ports. 
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4.2 Experiment on the Detection of the Neo-Call Spy Software 
Neo-Call is a spyware program similar to other spy software such as FlexiSPY or SpyPhone 
[22] that runs on most Symbian handhelds. Neo-Call software was installed in a Nokia 6120 
Classic. It conducts eavesdropping, call interception, GPS tracking, etc, and monitors phone 
calls and SMS text messages. The malicious user receives the spy information through SMS to 
a phone and can control spy actions by sending new SMS to the attacked phone using the 
Neo-Control tool. This tool creates and sends formatted SMS automatically with specific 
codes and tags.  
    The SMS and Bluetooth misbehaviours have been tested. In both situations, the connections 
to send and receive information through SMS are established through sockets. In the proposed 
method, the Monitoring Module controls the port range for SMS protocol 
(KSMSDatagramProtocol [23]). Therefore, using the User Interface Module, in all tests 
carried out, the user was informed when Neo-call tried to send/receive an SMS to/from the 
malicious user. 
4.3 Experiment on the Detection of Cabir 
Cabir is the first network worm capable of spreading via Bluetooth; it infects mobile phones 
which run on Symbian OS. Bluetooth devices are sought by Cabir and once found, a file is 
transferred to them. In 2008, the Cabir code was published on the web [24]. Like other 
Symbian malware, Cabir uses a socket with Bluetooth RFCOMM protocol and 0x00000009 
port. Usually, port 0 is the normal port used to transfer files with the UI in Symbian OS. 
However, Cabir uses another port to prevent notification. 
    An experiment was carried out to discover when this malware tries to connect with other 
devices, but not when the file was transferred. In the proposed approach, the Connection 
Submodule includes the RFCOMM protocol and a wide port range. Hence, the attacked device 
is informed of the connection attempts through a message on the screen. 
4.4 Experimentation with real users using Neo-Call 
To test the proposed Trojan horse detection tool, a mobile phone with Symbian SO was given 
to fifteen users during five days. The set of users were composed of five computer science 
colleagues, five students of computer science and five relatives without experience in 
computer science. The malicious software Neo-Call and an application which implemented 
our detection method were installed in each phone. Another malicious user sent various SMS 
to each phone to use the Neo-Call to spy the phones and, consequently, test the method. We 
observed that phone skills and expertise using a mobile phone is critical. Although computer 
science researchers and students can distinguish the suspicious activity, users with no 
experience used to include all or none of the malicious activity on it. That is evidence that, 
despite the detection method always shows an alert message when a SMS was sending, it is 
necessary for the users of a previous knowledge about the most common Bluetooth and 
messaging applications to decide when a suspicious application can attack the phone. To avoid 
this misbehavior, we are working on the improvement of the User Interface module to help 
users without experience to make decisions. 
5. Conclusion 
We conclude this paper by discussing the limitations encountered in pursuit of this work, 
along with concluding remarks. 
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5.1 Limitations 
Our method can be implemented on various mobile operating systems. However, mobile 
frameworks provide different tools for event handling and our detection approach must be 
adapted. Furthermore, only a few Trojan horse samples are publicly available for research. 
Testing detection systems with real-world malware is necessary for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of any detection system, however due to the nature of in-the-wild malware 
activities, effective and comprehensive evaluation and testing with real-world Trojan horse 
samples are difficult to carry out. Moreover, during legitimate events, such as a natural 
disaster, false positive may emerge in our system. These forms of unusual events will be 
difficult to distinguish from virus outbreak based only on the connection or message details. 
To address this issue, a user survey system can be employed to query a subset of the suspected 
user on whether the suspicious activity is intentional. If users confirm the suspicious activity 
then the method will refrain from reaction. 
5.2 Concluding Remarks 
The attacks on mobile handhelds, especially intrusions made by Trojan horses have been 
studied. Based on the analysis of the operation mechanism of Trojan horses, an effective 
method to detect these infections in messaging and Bluetooth services has been presented. The 
proposed method has two modules, the Graphical User module to notify about possible 
infections and the Monitoring module to control the connection requests and analyze the 
sent/received files. Using real-world malware such as Cabir and Neo-Call, we experimentally 
show that our method can effectively and efficiently detect their existence.  
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